Files
dictia-public/config/env.oauth.example
Allison b8fa321edd feat(auth): B-2.6 WebAuthn / Passkey support (FIDO2 + biometric 2FA)
Adds phishing-resistant 2nd factor via FIDO2 hardware keys (YubiKey etc.)
and device biometrics (Touch ID, Windows Hello, etc.). Reuses the existing
B-2.5 TOTP gate so a passkey is a 3rd valid option on /2fa/verify, alongside
TOTP code and recovery code. Post-login enrolment lives at /2fa/passkey/setup.

Wraps python-webauthn==2.5.2 in a thin service layer (src/auth/webauthn.py)
that persists credentials in the existing User.webauthn_credentials JSON
column (added in B-2.1 — no schema change). Each credential dict carries
id, public_key, sign_count, transports, name, and created_at. sign_count is
updated after every successful authentication for WebAuthn anti-cloning
(§6.1.1).

Backend: 6 new auth routes (passkey_setup, register/begin, register/finish,
delete, auth/begin, auth/finish). The 4 JSON endpoints are CSRF-exempt at
Flask-WTF level because CSRFProtect cannot read tokens from a JSON body
without app-wide config; the X-CSRFToken header is still sent as
defence-in-depth. The form-POST delete route DOES enforce CSRF. The
@csrf_exempt decorator was previously a no-op label; init_auth_extensions
now walks module-level functions and applies real csrf.exempt() to any
flagged with _csrf_exempt=True.

Login gate now fires when the user has TOTP enabled OR at least one
passkey, and totp_verify_login passes has_passkeys + has_totp flags so the
template can show only the relevant sections.

Frontend: templates/auth/totp_verify.html updated IN PLACE with a passkey
button section (above TOTP) and an "ou" divider. New
templates/auth/passkey_setup.html for managing/enrolling passkeys. New
static/js/webauthn-client.js (no external deps, ES2020) wraps
navigator.credentials and exchanges base64url payloads with the backend.
Tailwind CSS rebuilt.

Tests: 22 new tests in tests/test_webauthn_passkey.py covering the service
layer (b64url helpers, RP config, list/has, begin/finish for both
registration and authentication, delete) and the route flow (CSRF-exempt
JSON endpoints, login gate redirection, sign_count anti-cloning
persistence). Mocks python-webauthn's verify_* functions so tests run
without a real authenticator. Windows manual driver follows the existing
no-conftest pattern.

Self-review: 22/22 new tests pass; 21/21 prior TOTP, 16/16 email,
21/21 OAuth tests still pass (no regression).

Env: config/env.oauth.example documents WEBAUTHN_RP_ID, WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME,
WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN with full deployment notes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 00:27:09 -04:00

102 lines
5.2 KiB
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###############################################################################
# OAuth Providers — Microsoft 365 + Google (B-2.4)
###############################################################################
#
# These providers complement (do NOT replace) the generic OIDC SSO at
# config/env.sso.example. Both can be enabled simultaneously: users see
# Microsoft 365, Google, and SSO buttons on /login, plus the magic-link
# fallback that does not require any OAuth provider.
#
# IMPORTANT — Loi 25 art. 14 (consent must be granular, free, informed):
# OAuth signups still require Loi 25 consent capture via
# /auth/oauth/finish-signup BEFORE the User row is created. Existing
# users (matched by sso_subject or email) skip the consent page and log
# in directly.
#
# Magic-link login (/auth/magic-link, /auth/magic-link/<token>) reuses
# the SMTP settings from env.email.example — no additional env vars needed.
###############################################################################
# Microsoft 365 (Microsoft Entra ID, formerly Azure AD)
###############################################################################
# 1. Register a new app at https://entra.microsoft.com
# > Identity > Applications > App registrations > New registration
# 2. Set the redirect URI to:
# https://your-domain.example/auth/oauth/microsoft/callback
# 3. Generate a client secret under Certificates & secrets > Client secrets
# 4. Set MS_CLIENT_ID to the Application (client) ID
# 5. Set MS_CLIENT_SECRET to the secret VALUE (NOT the secret ID)
#
# Tenant restriction: by default the OAuth flow accepts users from any
# Microsoft tenant (server_metadata_url uses /common/). To restrict to a
# specific organization, edit src/auth/oauth_providers.py and replace
# /common/ with your tenant ID (e.g. /your-tenant-id-guid/).
#
# MS_CLIENT_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
# MS_CLIENT_SECRET=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
###############################################################################
# Google (Google Cloud Console)
###############################################################################
# 1. Create an OAuth client at https://console.cloud.google.com
# > APIs & Services > Credentials > Create Credentials > OAuth client ID
# Application type: "Web application"
# 2. Set the redirect URI to:
# https://your-domain.example/auth/oauth/google/callback
# 3. Configure the OAuth consent screen in the same console
# (must be in "Production" status to accept users outside the test list)
# 4. Set GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET from the credentials page
#
# GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=xxxxxxxxxxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx.apps.googleusercontent.com
# GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=GOCSPX-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
###############################################################################
# Notes
###############################################################################
#
# Token storage:
# - sso_provider stores the literal string "microsoft" or "google"
# - sso_subject stores the OAuth `sub` claim (provider-issued user ID)
# - email_verified is set to True automatically (the provider has
# already verified the email address)
# - password is NULL for OAuth-only accounts; users can set a password
# later via /forgot-password if they want a fallback login method
#
# Magic-link tokens:
# - Stateless via itsdangerous.URLSafeTimedSerializer
# - 15-minute expiry, signed with SECRET_KEY + salt 'magic-link-login'
# - No DB column — tokens are not single-use within the 15-min window
# - SMTP must be configured (see env.email.example) for the link to send
###############################################################################
# WebAuthn / Passkey (B-2.6)
###############################################################################
# Phishing-resistant 2nd factor via FIDO2 hardware keys (YubiKey etc.) and
# device biometrics (Touch ID, Windows Hello). Browsers strictly enforce that
# the values below match the page making the WebAuthn API call:
#
# - WEBAUTHN_RP_ID : the registrable host name (NO scheme, NO port). Must
# match the eTLD+1 of the page or be a parent domain. For dictia.ca use
# 'dictia.ca'; for staging at app.staging.dictia.ca use 'dictia.ca' or
# 'staging.dictia.ca'. Defaults to 'localhost' for local development.
#
# - WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME : the display name shown to the user inside their
# authenticator's prompt (e.g. 'Sign in to DictIA'). Defaults to 'DictIA'.
#
# - WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN : the FULL origin including scheme + host + optional
# port. MUST equal window.location.origin on the client side. Mismatches
# are rejected by the browser before the request even reaches the server.
# Defaults to 'http://localhost:8899' for local development.
#
# Credentials are persisted in user.webauthn_credentials (JSON column,
# added in B-2.1). Each credential dict contains base64url id, public_key,
# sign_count (anti-cloning per WebAuthn §6.1.1), transports, name, and
# created_at. The 4 JSON endpoints (register/begin, register/finish,
# auth/begin, auth/finish) are CSRF-exempt at Flask-WTF level because
# CSRFProtect cannot read tokens from a JSON body without app-wide config.
# An X-CSRFToken header is still sent by the client as defence-in-depth.
#
# WEBAUTHN_RP_ID=dictia.ca
# WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME=DictIA
# WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN=https://dictia.ca