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6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Allison
b8fa321edd feat(auth): B-2.6 WebAuthn / Passkey support (FIDO2 + biometric 2FA) 
Adds phishing-resistant 2nd factor via FIDO2 hardware keys (YubiKey etc.)
and device biometrics (Touch ID, Windows Hello, etc.). Reuses the existing
B-2.5 TOTP gate so a passkey is a 3rd valid option on /2fa/verify, alongside
TOTP code and recovery code. Post-login enrolment lives at /2fa/passkey/setup.

Wraps python-webauthn==2.5.2 in a thin service layer (src/auth/webauthn.py)
that persists credentials in the existing User.webauthn_credentials JSON
column (added in B-2.1 — no schema change). Each credential dict carries
id, public_key, sign_count, transports, name, and created_at. sign_count is
updated after every successful authentication for WebAuthn anti-cloning
(§6.1.1).

Backend: 6 new auth routes (passkey_setup, register/begin, register/finish,
delete, auth/begin, auth/finish). The 4 JSON endpoints are CSRF-exempt at
Flask-WTF level because CSRFProtect cannot read tokens from a JSON body
without app-wide config; the X-CSRFToken header is still sent as
defence-in-depth. The form-POST delete route DOES enforce CSRF. The
@csrf_exempt decorator was previously a no-op label; init_auth_extensions
now walks module-level functions and applies real csrf.exempt() to any
flagged with _csrf_exempt=True.

Login gate now fires when the user has TOTP enabled OR at least one
passkey, and totp_verify_login passes has_passkeys + has_totp flags so the
template can show only the relevant sections.

Frontend: templates/auth/totp_verify.html updated IN PLACE with a passkey
button section (above TOTP) and an "ou" divider. New
templates/auth/passkey_setup.html for managing/enrolling passkeys. New
static/js/webauthn-client.js (no external deps, ES2020) wraps
navigator.credentials and exchanges base64url payloads with the backend.
Tailwind CSS rebuilt.

Tests: 22 new tests in tests/test_webauthn_passkey.py covering the service
layer (b64url helpers, RP config, list/has, begin/finish for both
registration and authentication, delete) and the route flow (CSRF-exempt
JSON endpoints, login gate redirection, sign_count anti-cloning
persistence). Mocks python-webauthn's verify_* functions so tests run
without a real authenticator. Windows manual driver follows the existing
no-conftest pattern.

Self-review: 22/22 new tests pass; 21/21 prior TOTP, 16/16 email,
21/21 OAuth tests still pass (no regression).

Env: config/env.oauth.example documents WEBAUTHN_RP_ID, WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME,
WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN with full deployment notes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-28 00:27:09 -04:00
Allison
aa269c5bc0 feat(auth): B-2.5 TOTP MFA + recovery codes (Fernet-encrypted secret) 
Adds TOTP-based two-factor authentication (RFC 6238) with 10 single-use
recovery codes. Secret is encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived
deterministically from app SECRET_KEY (SHA-256 -> urlsafe-base64); the raw
base32 secret never lives in the database. Recovery codes are bcrypt-hashed
and consumed atomically (single-use, removed from the JSON list on match).

Routes:
- GET /2fa/setup: generate fresh secret + QR + 10 recovery codes; cache
  pending state in session, render auth/totp_setup.html with inline QR
  data URL and the 10 codes shown ONCE.
- POST /2fa/setup: verify the user-submitted 6-digit code against the
  pending secret; on success persist encrypted secret + hashes and flip
  totp_enabled=True. On invalid code re-render same QR (don't rotate),
  preserving the user's authenticator scan.
- GET /2fa/verify: second factor during login; reads pending_totp_user_id
  from session and renders auth/totp_verify.html (TOTP code input +
  collapsed recovery code form, with X codes restants notice).
- POST /2fa/verify: accepts EITHER a 6-digit TOTP code OR a recovery code;
  on success finalises login_user (preserving remember-me intent + next
  URL captured at the password step), audits success/failure.
- POST /2fa/disable: requires password re-auth; nullifies the 3 TOTP fields.

Login gate (src/api/auth.py /login): after password+email-verification
checks but BEFORE login_user, if user.totp_enabled set
session['pending_totp_user_id'] / pending_totp_remember /
pending_totp_next and 302 -> /2fa/verify. OAuth/SSO/magic-link paths are
intentionally NOT gated in B-2.5 (deferred — IdP handles its own MFA).

Schema:
- New JSON column User.totp_recovery_codes (nullable) added via
  add_column_if_not_exists in src/init_db.py (no Alembic, follows existing
  pattern).
- Re-uses B-2.1 columns totp_secret_encrypted (VARCHAR 255) and
  totp_enabled (BOOLEAN); both already migrated.

Compatibility audit overrides honoured:
- Service layer at src/auth/totp.py (NOT a new src/auth_extended/ pkg).
- Templates at templates/auth/totp_setup.html and templates/auth/totp_verify.html
  extending marketing/base.html with brand tokens + WCAG patterns
  (focus-visible, role=alert, aria-required, autocomplete=one-time-code,
  inputmode=numeric).
- account.html integration deferred to a polish task — admins access
  /2fa/setup directly for now.

Tests (21, all green via Windows manual driver):
- Service layer: encrypt/decrypt round-trip, key-mismatch rejection, secret
  validity, code verification (current/wrong/non-digit), recovery codes
  (10 pairs, 1:1 bcrypt mapping, single-use consumption, unknown rejection),
  set/disable user TOTP fields.
- Routes: login redirect-to-/2fa/verify when totp_enabled, direct login
  when disabled, /2fa/verify with correct/wrong TOTP, recovery code consume,
  redirect-to-login when no pending session, /2fa/setup GET creates pending,
  POST with valid code enables MFA, POST with invalid code keeps pending +
  returns 400, /2fa/disable wrong/correct password.

Regression check: prior 21 OAuth+magic-link, 16 email-service, and 9
signup-Loi-25 tests all still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-28 00:08:40 -04:00
Allison
0513e67838 feat(auth): B-2.4 OAuth Microsoft/Google + magic link (Loi 25 deferred consent) 
Adds Microsoft 365 + Google OAuth providers (separate from the existing
generic OIDC SSO at src/auth/sso.py) and a passwordless magic-link login
flow. New OAuth signups capture Loi 25 art. 14 consents (4 granular
checkboxes) BEFORE creating the User row via /auth/oauth/finish-signup.

Per compatibility-audit.md C2:
- No src/auth_extended/ directory — extends src/auth/ in place
- No new User columns — reuses sso_provider/sso_subject + email_verified
- Magic-link tokens via itsdangerous URLSafeTimedSerializer (15-min, no DB)
- All routes added to existing auth_bp; templates extend marketing/base.html
- Anti-enumeration on /auth/magic-link (generic flash for unknown OR
  unverified emails) and /auth/magic-link/<token> (same flash for
  invalid/expired/unverified-user)

Files added:
- src/auth/oauth_providers.py — Microsoft + Google OAuth registration,
  is_oauth_provider_enabled(), find_user_by_oauth(), create_oauth_user_with_consent()
- src/auth/magic_link.py — generate/consume magic-link tokens
- templates/auth/magic_link_request.html, templates/auth/oauth_finish_signup.html
- tests/test_oauth_magic_link.py + tests/_run_oauth_magic_link_windows.py (16 tests)
- config/env.oauth.example

Files modified:
- src/api/auth.py — 5 new routes (oauth_provider_login/callback,
  oauth_finish_signup, magic_link_request/consume); login flashes translated FR;
  oauth_*_enabled flags passed to login template
- src/app.py — wires init_oauth_providers(app) after blueprint registration
- src/services/email.py — adds send_magic_link_email() (FR + DictIA brand)
- templates/login.html — refondu IN PLACE (was 178 lines legacy Vue/TW3)
  to extend marketing/base.html with OAuth buttons, password form,
  magic-link CTA, signup link
- templates/auth/check_email.html — adds action='magic_link' branch
- static/css/tailwind.config.js — adds templates/login.html to content
- static/css/marketing.css — rebuilt

Tests: 16/16 PASS via Windows manual driver.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 23:29:24 -04:00
Allison
dd270bca9e fix(auth): B-2.3 security review fixes — XSS escape + token replay 
Targeted fixes for issues raised by code review on commit 37639a7
(B-2.3 DictIA email rebrand). All fixes verified against the Windows
manual driver: 16/16 tests pass (12 pre-existing + 4 new regression).

Critical:
  - C1 Stored XSS in transactional emails: user.name (validated only on
    Length(max=49), no character class) was rendered raw into the f-string
    HTML body of verification + reset emails. Added html.escape on the
    HTML branch; text body keeps the raw string (no XSS surface). Also
    hardened the fallback chain to ((name or '').strip() or username or
    'utilisateur').strip() so a None/whitespace name never produces
    'Bonjour ,'.
  - C2 Reflected XSS in templates/auth/check_email.html: the email value
    from request.form was concatenated with literal '<strong>' tags then
    fed through | safe, defeating Jinja's autoescape. Split the string so
    template-author HTML stays literal and {{ email }} is autoescaped.
    Used &#160; for NBSP instead of '1&nbsp;heure' | safe (more readable).

Important:
  - I1 Dropped {{ message | safe }} on flash blocks in
    forgot_password.html and reset_password.html (matches check_email.html).
    No XSS today (flashes are static literals) but removes the landmine.
  - I2 Password reset token replay: URLSafeTimedSerializer is stateless,
    so the same valid link could be clicked twice within the 1h window.
    Added a check that user.password_reset_token == token after the user
    lookup — runs before BOTH GET (form render) and POST (password update).
    The existing 'user.password_reset_token = None' on success now
    actually invalidates the token.
  - I5 MIMEText defaults to us-ascii, which Q-encodes accented French
    characters and produces mojibake in some clients. Added explicit
    'utf-8' charset on both text and html parts in _send_email.

New regression tests (tests/test_email_service_dictia.py):
  - test_verification_email_falls_back_when_name_is_whitespace (I4)
  - test_verification_email_handles_unicode_name (I5)
  - test_verification_email_escapes_html_in_user_name (C1)
  - test_check_email_template_escapes_email_in_response (C2)

Out of scope (per review): M1 (already addressed via solid-color
fallback), M2 (datetime.utcnow — pre-existing, separate cleanup),
M3 (Windows test driver — documented in tests file docstring),
M4-M6 (deferred).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 23:14:11 -04:00
Allison
37639a7d09 feat(auth): B-2.3 emails FR + DictIA branding (SMTP Resend) 
Rebrand src/services/email.py IN PLACE: French + DictIA + brand gradient
(#0062ff/#00bdd8/#00c896) — replaces legacy "Speakr" / #2563eb. Greetings now
use user.name with fallback to user.username. Subjects:
"Vérifiez votre courriel — DictIA" + "Réinitialiser votre mot de passe — DictIA".
SMTP_FROM_NAME defaults to DictIA. Footer points to info@dictia.ca with the
Loi 25 tagline.

Refonte 4 auth templates IN PLACE pour étendre marketing/base.html : check_email,
forgot_password, reset_password, verify_success. Tokens DictIA (brand-navy,
brand-bg, grad-bg, shadow-cta), French copy, WCAG patterns (label for,
focus-visible:outline-2, role=alert, aria-required, text-brand-navy/70 minimum,
NBSP français pour Loi 25 / 24 heures / 1 heure / 8 caractères).

Translate inline French flash messages in src/api/auth.py for /verify-email,
/resend-verification, /forgot-password, /reset-password. Anti-enumeration fix:
forgot_password no longer flashes the cooldown remaining (would leak account
existence) — silently skips resend, generic flash unchanged. Cooldown logic
in src/services/email.py UNCHANGED (60s — verified by test).

config/env.email.example: defaults to Resend SMTP at the top + adds Resend
to the provider examples list (preserves Gmail/SendGrid/Mailgun/SES/M365).

Tests: tests/test_email_service_dictia.py — 12 tests covering DictIA branding,
French copy, display-name fallback, anti-enumeration parity (forgot_password
returns identical message for known/unknown emails), 60s cooldown, SMTP-not-
configured returns False (no exception), check_email.html extends marketing/base
(no var(--text-primary) leaks). Includes Windows manual driver
(_run_email_service_dictia_windows.py) since pytest cannot collect on Windows
native (fcntl POSIX-only).

NO new dependency added (no resend SDK — SMTP via existing _send_email).
NO new route added or removed.
NO src/auth_extended/ created.
NO change to itsdangerous-based token logic.
templates/auth/**/*.html already in tailwind.config.js content array (B-2.2).

Verified locally on Windows manual driver: 12/12 PASS B-2.3, 9/9 PASS regression
on B-2.2 signup, 9/9 PASS regression on B-2.1 ConsentLog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 23:02:20 -04:00
InnovA AI
42772a31ed Initial release: DictIA v0.8.14-alpha (fork de Speakr, AGPL-3.0) 2026-03-16 21:47:37 +00:00