Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Allison
aa269c5bc0 feat(auth): B-2.5 TOTP MFA + recovery codes (Fernet-encrypted secret)
Adds TOTP-based two-factor authentication (RFC 6238) with 10 single-use
recovery codes. Secret is encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived
deterministically from app SECRET_KEY (SHA-256 -> urlsafe-base64); the raw
base32 secret never lives in the database. Recovery codes are bcrypt-hashed
and consumed atomically (single-use, removed from the JSON list on match).

Routes:
- GET /2fa/setup: generate fresh secret + QR + 10 recovery codes; cache
  pending state in session, render auth/totp_setup.html with inline QR
  data URL and the 10 codes shown ONCE.
- POST /2fa/setup: verify the user-submitted 6-digit code against the
  pending secret; on success persist encrypted secret + hashes and flip
  totp_enabled=True. On invalid code re-render same QR (don't rotate),
  preserving the user's authenticator scan.
- GET /2fa/verify: second factor during login; reads pending_totp_user_id
  from session and renders auth/totp_verify.html (TOTP code input +
  collapsed recovery code form, with X codes restants notice).
- POST /2fa/verify: accepts EITHER a 6-digit TOTP code OR a recovery code;
  on success finalises login_user (preserving remember-me intent + next
  URL captured at the password step), audits success/failure.
- POST /2fa/disable: requires password re-auth; nullifies the 3 TOTP fields.

Login gate (src/api/auth.py /login): after password+email-verification
checks but BEFORE login_user, if user.totp_enabled set
session['pending_totp_user_id'] / pending_totp_remember /
pending_totp_next and 302 -> /2fa/verify. OAuth/SSO/magic-link paths are
intentionally NOT gated in B-2.5 (deferred — IdP handles its own MFA).

Schema:
- New JSON column User.totp_recovery_codes (nullable) added via
  add_column_if_not_exists in src/init_db.py (no Alembic, follows existing
  pattern).
- Re-uses B-2.1 columns totp_secret_encrypted (VARCHAR 255) and
  totp_enabled (BOOLEAN); both already migrated.

Compatibility audit overrides honoured:
- Service layer at src/auth/totp.py (NOT a new src/auth_extended/ pkg).
- Templates at templates/auth/totp_setup.html and templates/auth/totp_verify.html
  extending marketing/base.html with brand tokens + WCAG patterns
  (focus-visible, role=alert, aria-required, autocomplete=one-time-code,
  inputmode=numeric).
- account.html integration deferred to a polish task — admins access
  /2fa/setup directly for now.

Tests (21, all green via Windows manual driver):
- Service layer: encrypt/decrypt round-trip, key-mismatch rejection, secret
  validity, code verification (current/wrong/non-digit), recovery codes
  (10 pairs, 1:1 bcrypt mapping, single-use consumption, unknown rejection),
  set/disable user TOTP fields.
- Routes: login redirect-to-/2fa/verify when totp_enabled, direct login
  when disabled, /2fa/verify with correct/wrong TOTP, recovery code consume,
  redirect-to-login when no pending session, /2fa/setup GET creates pending,
  POST with valid code enables MFA, POST with invalid code keeps pending +
  returns 400, /2fa/disable wrong/correct password.

Regression check: prior 21 OAuth+magic-link, 16 email-service, and 9
signup-Loi-25 tests all still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 00:08:40 -04:00
Allison
8792ffb8a4 fix(auth): B-2.1 — FK erasure policy, totp_secret_encrypted, validates, docs
- ConsentLog.user_id: nullable=True + ondelete='SET NULL' for Loi 25 art. 28.1
  right-to-erasure (audit row survives user deletion, user_id nulled out).
  Matches existing pattern in auth_log.py / access_log.py.
- Add ConsentLog.@validates('consent_type') to reject typos at ORM level
  (silent typos in audit data are very hard to detect later).
- Rename User.totp_secret -> totp_secret_encrypted (size 64->255 for Fernet
  envelope). Self-documenting contract: never assign plaintext to this column.
- init_db.py: drop NOT NULL from totp_enabled migration string for consistency
  with every other Boolean column in the file (model-side nullable=False is
  sufficient).
- Docs: User class docstring updated to reflect MFA/billing/ordre context;
  webauthn_credentials shape documented; version column policy documented.
- Tests: cleaner IntegrityError catch; add survives_user_deletion test
  (right-to-erasure); add rejects_invalid_consent_type test (validator).
2026-04-27 21:57:32 -04:00
Allison
48d2abfa74 feat(auth): B-2.1 ConsentLog model (Loi 25) + User MFA/OAuth/Stripe fields
- New src/models/consent.py — ConsentLog with user_id FK, consent_type
  ('cgu' | 'confidentialite' | 'marketing' | 'analytics'), version, granted
  bool, granted_at/revoked_at timestamps, ip_address (45 chars for IPv6),
  user_agent (500 chars). User.consent_logs backref. Audit trail per
  LPRPSP art. 14 (consent tracé) + art. 3.5 (journal).
- src/models/user.py: add 7 new columns (totp_secret, totp_enabled DEFAULT 0,
  webauthn_credentials JSON, ordre_pro, cabinet, stripe_customer_id,
  subscription_status). Do NOT duplicate existing sso_provider/sso_subject/
  email_verified/etc. (per compatibility-audit C4).
- src/init_db.py: 7 add_column_if_not_exists() calls for the new User
  columns + 2 create_index_if_not_exists() for stripe_customer_id and
  subscription_status. NO Alembic — init_db.py pattern matches
  compatibility-audit C3.
- src/models/__init__.py: register ConsentLog import.
- tests/test_consent_log.py: 7 tests — grant flow, 4 consent types, revoke
  preserves audit trail, User backref, NOT NULL on ip/UA, User.B-2.1 fields
  round-trip, defaults safe.
2026-04-27 21:44:37 -04:00
InnovA AI
42772a31ed Initial release: DictIA v0.8.14-alpha (fork de Speakr, AGPL-3.0) 2026-03-16 21:47:37 +00:00